kernel stack - Robuta Search

https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/8/30/158 LKML: (David Wagner): Re: [S390] cio: kernel stack overflow. david wagner kernel stack lkml s390 cio https://www.linuxjournal.com/content/securing-kernel-stack Securing the Kernel Stack | Linux Journal the kernel securing stack linux journal https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/07/1 oss-security - Re: CVE request: multiple kernel stack memory disclosures kernel stack oss security cve request https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 oss-security - Re: CVE request: multiple kernel stack memory disclosures kernel stack oss security cve request https://ubuntu.com/kernel/lifecycle Ubuntu kernel lifecycle and enablement stack | Ubuntu Canonical provides long-term support (LTS) kernels for Ubuntu LTS releases. Canonical also provides interim operating system releases with updated kernels... ubuntu kernel lifecycle enablement stack https://jvns.ca/blog/2016/06/30/why-do-we-use-the-linux-kernels-tcp-stack/?ref=highscalability.com Why do we use the Linux kernel's TCP stack? Why do we use the Linux kernel's TCP stack? the linux kernel we use tcp stack https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/07/02/6 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack kernel hardening patch arm64 clear https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42747 Microsoft Windows Kernel - 'win32k!NtGdiGetFontResourceInfoInternalW' Stack Memory Disclosure -... Sep 18, 2017 - Microsoft Windows Kernel - 'win32k!NtGdiGetFontResourceInfoInternalW' Stack Memory Disclosure. CVE-2017-8684 . dos exploit for Windows platform microsoft windows stack memory kernel disclosure https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/04/18/6 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v2] fork: Unconditionally clear stack on fork kernel hardening patch v2 fork https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/05/23/24 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v3 20/27] x86: Support global stack cookie support global kernel hardening patch v3 https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/05/30/11 oss-security - Re: Linux kernel: stack buffer overflow with controlled payload in get_options()... https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/37 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCHv2 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support kernel hardening 00 14 arm64 https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/05/04/3 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/07/03/8 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack kernel hardening patch arm64 clear https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/07/15/14 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation 11 mm https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/38 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v4 15/17] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/22 kernel-hardening - [PATCHv2 13/14] arm64: add on_accessible_stack() add on kernel hardening 13 14 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/01/16/6 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization gcc plugins https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/02/19/7 kernel-hardening - Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/10 kernel-hardening - [PATCHv2 01/14] arm64: remove __die()'s stack dump die s kernel hardening 01 14 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/12/12/5 kernel-hardening - Re: Remaining crypto API regressions with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK crypto api kernel hardening remaining https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9352 Linux Kernel 2.6.31-rc5 - sigaltstack 4-Byte Stack Disclosure - Linux local Exploit Aug 4, 2009 - Linux Kernel 2.6.31-rc5 - sigaltstack 4-Byte Stack Disclosure. CVE-57208CVE-2009-2847 . local exploit for Linux platform linux kernel 2 6 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/36 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCHv2 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support kernel hardening 00 14 arm64 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/07/03/10 kernel-hardening - Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks https://reactos.org/archives/public/ros-dev/2004-October/000333.html [ros-dev] Kernel-mode stack layout (FPU save area, trap frames, etc.) kernel mode https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/06/27/3 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v13 (resend) 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack... https://stack.tradingkernel.com/ Home - Trading Kernel Stack Feb 25, 2025 - Trading Kernel Stack is where developers shape the future of trading software, together. Contribute to the open source trading community. trading kernel stack https://reactos.org/archives/public/ros-dev/2004-October/000330.html [ros-dev] Kernel-mode stack layout (FPU save area, trap frames, etc.) kernel mode https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/18/663 LKML: Steven Rostedt: Re: [PATCH] print kdump kernel loaded status in stack dump https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/34 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCHv2 02/14] fork: allow arch-override of VMAP stack alignment https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/03/13/38 kernel-hardening - Re: [RESEND] rsi: Remove stack VLA usage kernel hardening resend rsi remove https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/3/6/1777 LKML: Sasha Levin: Re: [PATCH 1/3] kallsyms: embed source file:line info in kernel stack traces https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/7/3/111 LKML: Vasiliy Kulikov: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy... https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/05/04/2 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/25 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCHv2 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support kernel hardening 00 14 arm64 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/06/20/7 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/03/31/25 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/1 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 17/17] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack kernel hardening patch v3 https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46006 Linux Kernel 4.4 - 'rtnetlink' Stack Memory Disclosure - Linux local Exploit Dec 19, 2018 - Linux Kernel 4.4 - 'rtnetlink' Stack Memory Disclosure. CVE-2016-4486 . local exploit for Linux platform linux kernel stack memory 4 disclosure local https://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/10/31/3 oss-security - Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Stack guard canary massaging oss security kernel hardening stack https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/06/21/12 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/02/25/18 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v9 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack 10 12 kernel hardening patch v9 https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/07/18/4 kernel-hardening - [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Introduce current_stack_type 1 2 kernel hardening patch arm64 https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/12/30/52 LKML: guoren@kernel ...: [PATCH 2/5] csky: Initial stack protector support kernel patch 2 5 lkml https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/7 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/11 kernel-hardening - [PATCHv2 02/14] fork: allow arch-override of VMAP stack alignment https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/07/11/45 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v5 31/32] sched: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/04/16/26 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v11 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack 10 12 kernel hardening patch v11 https://www.turnkeylinux.org/comment/10485 Kernel panic under VMWare ESXi -Turnkey LAMP Stack | TurnKey GNU/Linux Hello everybody, I have a little situation right here, so I decided to ask for some help. I'm running VMWare ESXi on machine with Windows Server 2003. I... kernel panic vmware esxi lamp stack turnkey gnu https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/07/03/15 kernel-hardening - Re: Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/03/14/11 kernel-hardening - Re: [RESEND] rsi: Remove stack VLA usage kernel hardening resend rsi remove https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/04/16/24 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v11 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/04/10/12 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] x86: usercopy: reimplement arch_within_stack_frames with... https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/06/03/17 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/5 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/02/01/16 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v6 20/27] x86: Support global stack cookie https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/06/27/6 kernel-hardening - Re: non-x86 per-task stack canaries kernel hardening non x86 per https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822 LKML: Marco Elver: [PATCH 1/2] kernel/fork: Add support for stack-end guard page https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/30 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v4 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/13/1 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack https://www.cnx-software.com/2010/07/11/uclinux-kernel-panic-stack-overflow/ uClinux kernel panic: Stack overflow - CNX Software Nov 24, 2019 - If you're using ucLinux, you may get kernel panic errors coming out of nowhere. There may be several reasons (buffer overflow, out of memory..), but the kernel panic stack overflow uclinux cnx software https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/40 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v4 17/17] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack kernel hardening patch v4 17 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/21 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2020/05/04/4 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/05/32 kernel-hardening - [PATCH v5 12/14] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack 12 14 https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/03/21/4 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH RFC v9 2/7] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the... https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/11/10/27 kernel-hardening - Re: vDSO maximum stack usage, stack probes, and -fstack-check kernel hardening vdso maximum https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2019/11/01/41 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCH v4 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) https://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/06/12/11 kernel-hardening - [PATCH 3.18 26/45] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random... https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/08/15/31 kernel-hardening - Re: [PATCHv2 02/14] fork: allow arch-override of VMAP stack alignment